Dubito Ergo Cogito. Cogito Ergo Sum

Nous avons des informations qui proviennent directement d’une autorité impliquée dans cette situation désastreuse. Une interview du Ministre Beninois des TIC Max Awêkè par AFRIK.COM. Enfin, diront certains ! En tout cas je suis bien heureux qu’il ait donné ces informations sur la crise.

Venons-en aux informations et analyses données par le Ministre.

Max Awêkè : Le Bénin a effectivement, depuis plus d’un mois, des problèmes avec Internet à cause d’un incident banal. C’est l’incendie de notre station à la plage. Tout le matériel technique a été ravagé par le feu. Avec cet événement malheureux, il est impossible d’avoir accès à Internet dans tout le Bénin ainsi que dans les pays de l’hinterland.

Quel est donc cet « incident banal » dont parle M. le Ministre ? Un incendie provenant d’un court-circuit sur un climatiseur dans la salle d’équipements. Ce qu'il y a de malheureux dans cet « incident banal », c’est le manque total de protection de base pour une installation aussi stratégique et aussi coûteuse. Quelles sont les normes suivies pour la construction de ce local ? Où sont les détecteurs de fumée ?  Le système d’extinction automatique d’incendie (sprinkler), les gardes devant assurer la sécurité d’un centre névralgique aussi important ? Que fait un simple climatiseur si près des installations ? La climatisation centrale n’est-elle pas mieux indiquée ?

Voilà bien de questions qui expliquent les racines profondes de cet « incident banal ». En fait ce qui est banal, c’est la légèreté et le manque de responsabilité avec lesquels ces installations sont gérées.  Ce qui est banal, c’est le fait que personne n’ait eu à répondre de ces fautes grossières et graves. Ce qui est banal, c’est qu’on ne comprenne pas à un si haut niveau de responsabilité que la solution au problème commence par la compréhension du problème.  Ce qui s’est passé n’est point banal, c’était banalement prévisible.  

Aussitôt, la Direction générale de Bénin Télécoms, avec mon consentement, a fait venir Alcatel, la société qui a installé la station béninoise à la plage. Quand les employés d’Alcatel sont venus faire l’état des lieux, ils ont estimé qu’il vaudrait mieux que le consortium auquel nous appartenons intervienne directement pour trouver une solution adéquate aux vues des immenses dégâts. Et présentement, le consortium a déjà contacté France Télécom qui viendra remplacer tout ce qui a été brûlé. France Télécom doit donc tout renouveler afin que l’on ait une connexion viable, à long terme. 

Même quand toutes les mesures de sécurité sont prises, il y a des sinistres qui peuvent se produire. On le concède. Pour cela, toute organisation, même la plus petite entreprise ayant un réseau informatique met en place un « Disaster Recovery Plan » un Plan de Reprise après Sinistre. Quel est le plan de Benin Télécoms SA ? Surtout dans un contexte où il y a déjà eu en moins de 24 mois deux sections du câble sous-marin connectant le Benin au reste du monde. Quelle irresponsabilité !  

L’indentification et l’analyse des risques et menaces de catastrophes devaient éviter ce problème. Mais une fois l’incident produit, il devait déjà avoir en place un comité de reprise après sinistre pour  mettre en exécution le plan B, C et/ou D dans cet ordre. Les procédures de notifications à toutes les parties prenantes y compris les clients doivent entrer en marche sous les 6 heures qui suivent.  L’évaluation des dégâts, la séquence des activités de rétablissement, la phase de reconstruction etc…, tout cela est préparé en avance et révisé périodiquement.  

Ce à quoi nous avons assisté et assistons toujours, c’est l’amateurisme, la réaction tardive aux problèmes et le blackout total d’informations pour le public.

La préoccupation principale doit être  de minimiser au maximum les périodes de coupures totales d’internet.

Cette panne est intervenue à trois jours de la tenue à Cotonou de la rencontre informelle des chefs d’État ou de gouvernement de l’Union africaine. Il fallait trouver une solution. Et la première qu’on a trouvée a été de louer des VSAT et de mettre aussi en complément le faisceau hertzien d’Abomey-Calavi (ville située dans la banlieue de Cotonou NDLR) pour que les médias nationaux et internationaux puissent faire leur travail pendant le sommet de l’Union africaine. Ça a marché et tout s’est bien passé. 

Quand il s’agit de satisfaire les chefs d’Etats, une solution a été vite trouvée. C’était d’une importance capitale. Mais lorsque l’économie du pays est ralentie, on peut aller doucement. On comprend mieux maintenant. Pourtant les ressources citées par le Ministre, louer des VSAT et de mettre aussi en complément le faisceau hertzien d’Abomey-Calavi sont des solutions que nous avons toujours demandées  pour les clients…même s’il faut offrir un service minimum à bas débit.  N’est-ce pas un bon plan B ou C prêt à entrer en exécution ?

Évidemment, le manque d’Internet embête tout le monde. Les opérateurs économiques, les douaniers, les journalistes… tous sont dans l’impossibilité de faire leurs activités quotidiennes. On a bien pris conscience des pertes financières. Mais ce qui nous a semblé le plus important est l’atteinte à notre crédibilité : le Bénin étant fournisseur d’Internet aux pays de l’hinterland (ndlr arrière-pays). Les citoyens de tous ces pays ne sont pas contents.

M. le Ministre, le manque d’internet ne m’embête pas. Il tue complétement toutes mes activités. Sans internet, je ne peux plus rien faire, Zilch Zéro, Nada ! Depuis que je suis au Benin, les coupures d’internet m’ont fait rater le délai de soumission (en ligne) d’un projet que mon organisation était sure de remporter ($250,000 US), annuler plusieurs formations nécessitant la connexion internet pour un manque à gagner de 15.000.000 FCFA, et plus récemment un billet d’avion Cotonou-Washington DC pour pouvoir travailler sur un projet important.

Mais à lire la réponse du Ministre, on voit qu’il est plus intéressé par ses clients de l’hinterland que par ceux du Benin. « Ce qui nous a semblé le plus important est l’atteinte à notre crédibilité : le Bénin étant fournisseur d’Internet aux pays de l’hinterland ». Vraiment ? Le plus important ce ne sont pas les clients du Benin qui n’ont pas du tout internet alors que les pays de l’hinterland ont des connexions secondaires ? Merci M. le Ministre mais nous avions déjà compris que nous, clients du Benin, nous venons après.

Toutes les autres initiatives dont parle le Ministre n’aboutiront à rien si les causes racines ne trouvent pas de solutions. La cause première de ce désastre, c’est le leadership. Sous d’autres cieux, en cas d’incompétence notée ou notoire, vous démissionnez ou on vous montre la porte. Pas au Benin. Nous ne sommes pas sortis de l’auberge. 

 

Si la Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI)  respecte les nouveaux délais et donne les résultats provisoires de tous les bureaux de vote aujourd’hui, M. Joseph Kabila sera déclaré vainqueur des élections présidentielles en République Démocratique du Congo. Cette victoire très critiquée à l’intérieur comme à l’extérieur du pays m’amène à faire quelques observations.

1.       Sur la modification de la constitution, notamment l’article 71

Il serait difficile de se tromper en disant que Mr. Kabila avait déjà gagné les élections lorsqu’il a réussi l’amendement de la Constitution de 2006 en Janvier 2011.  

Article 71 de la Constitution de 2006
Le Président de la République est élu à la majorité absolue des suffrages exprimés. Si celle-ci n’est pas obtenue au premier tour du scrutin, il est procédé, dans un délai de quinze jours, à un second tour.
Seuls peuvent se présenter au second tour, les deux candidats qui ont recueilli le plus grand nombre des suffrages exprimés au premier tour. 
En cas de décès, d’empêchement ou de désistement de l’un ou l’autre de ces deux candidats, les suivants se présentent dans l’ordre de leur classement à l’issue du premier tour. 
Est déclaré élu au second tour, le candidat ayant recueilli la majorité des suffrages exprimés.

Article 71 (modifié par l’article 1er de la Loi n° 11/002 du 20 janvier 2011 portant  révision de certains articles de la Constitution de la République Démocratique du Congo)

Le Président de la République est élu à la majorité simple des suffrages exprimés.

Ce changement radical des règles du jeu facilite, quelle que soit sa popularité, la réélection de M. Kabila. Même les présidents Africains les plus contestés bénéficient de soutiens forts dans certains groupes ethniques et régionaux, notamment ceux dont ils proviennent. En plus de ces soutiens historiques, ils achètent avec les moyens de l’état l’allégeance d’autres groupes pour se retrouver entre 30 et 35 pourcent des suffrages exprimés. En y ajoutant 5 pourcent attribuables aux votes d’électeurs fictifs, mineurs ou étrangers et au tripatouillage de représentants locaux et de certains membres de la CENI, on se retrouve facilement aux 40 pourcent attribués actuellement au président candidat Kabila.

Toutefois, il est difficile, pratiquement impossible pour un candidat d’atteindre la majorité absolue au premier tour des élections dans un pays aussi vaste et divers que la RDC.

Pour l’opposition, accepter cette modification était accepter de facto la réélection de M. Kabila. Certains diront qu’ils n’avaient pas le choix, qu’ils n’avaient pas assez des représentants au parlement. Les Sénégalais, se trouvant dans une situation similaire lorsque M. Wade voulait instaurer un poste de vice-président, ont vite compris la supercherie et ont opposé la force de la rue à celle d’une Assemblée Nationale à la solde de la Présidence.  Ce n’est pas après les élections qu’il faut montrer sa force réelle dans la rue, c’est avant, pour que les règles du jeu soient équitables.

2.       Sur la désunion de l’opposition.

L’opposition congolaise s’est présentée aux élections en rangs désunis.  Il y a eu des tractions et négociations pour présenter un candidat unique. Elles ont lamentablement échouées parce que l’ambition personnelle des ténors de l’opposition était plus forte que l’avenir du Congo. M. Tshisekedi, le vieillissant opposant historique, se voyait à tort ou à raison comme le seul en mesure de gagner contre M. Kabila. Les autres le savaient peut-être mais leurs intérêts personnels étaient plus forts.  Certains ont préféré tester leur force nationale, d’autres ont voulu simplement barrer la route à M. Tshisekedi.

L’exemple ivoirien montre que quand l’opposition veut réellement faire partir l’homme au pouvoir, elle s’organise en avance et respecte ses engagements. Sans le RHDP, M. Ouattara n’aurait pas gagné les élections, et n’aurait pas eu le soutien national nécessaire pour résister à la tentative d’usurpation de la victoire par M. Gbagbo. Cette union de longue date a permis de contrôler les phases décisives du processus telles que la confection des listes électorales, la composition et le contrôle de la commission électorale et surtout le front commun contre M. Gbagbo pour que le suffrage des ivoiriens soit respecté. L’opposition congolaise malheureusement récolte une fois encore le fruit amer de sa désunion. Bientôt les Sénégalais crieront à leur tour haro sur le baudet, mais un troisième mandat de M. Wade ne serait que le résultat de l’impossibilité de l’opposition de choisir un candidat unique.

3.       Sur la légitimité de la victoire de M. Kabila

Le manque de transparence dans le processus électoral jette l’opprobre sur M. Kabila et sur sa victoire. Toutefois, les élections congolaises ne sont pas moins transparentes que celles organisées dans la majorité des « démocraties » africaines qui pourtant obtiennent le sceau d’approbation de la communauté internationale.  La transparence est un jeu du chat et de la souris. L’opposition bourre les urnes quand elle le peut mais essaie de réduire le bourrage provenant du candidat-président.  Il est possible que M. Kabila ait gagné les élections qu’il a organisées selon des règles qui l’avantagent. Victoire légitime ? Surement pas. Mais victoire toute de même.  

It has been two weeks since the arrest of Mr. Laurent Gbagbo in the basement of his Cocody residence. President Alassane Ouattara is now the uncontested leader of Ivory Coast. Or is he? An ongoing power struggle within the military coalition that installed him in power leads to caution against drawing any quick conclusions as to who’s really in charge. Furthermore, prospects for a rapid return to stability might be a bit optimistic.

Bad blood between Ibrahim Coulibaly and Guillaume Soro

Here is a very brief (simplistic even) summary of the troubled relationship between Mr. Ibrahim Coulibaly aka IB and Mr. Guillaume Soro. Allied in 2002, they led the failed coup attempt against the Gbagbo regime that ended-up dividing Ivory Coast in two zones. In 2004, militias controlled by the two men fought a bloody war for leadership of the Forces Nouvelles (FN), the then-rebels. Mr. Soro won the battle but the war was far from over.  In June 2007, IB was accused of ordering a failed assassination attempt on Mr. Soro (then Prime Minister of Gbagbo’s government). IB had been living in exile until he resurfaced as General Ibrahim Coulibaly, leader of the Invisible Commando.

Looking for respect, recognition and whatever comes with

It is undeniable that the Invisible Commando was a catalyst in the subsequent fall of Mr. Gbagbo’s government. They rescued what was left of the battered population of Abobo, a stronghold of Mr. Alassane Ouattara. Forces loyal to Mr Gbagbo suffered humiliating defeats in numerous battles against Mr. Coulibaly’s men. Unable to wage a guerilla war in the streets of Abobo, Gbagbo loyalists resorted to the murderous distance shelling that led to an international outcry and the ban on heavy weapons by the UN Security Council. As we now know, the enforcement of the ban by UNOCI and French forces led to the airstrikes that finally caused the fall of Mr. Gbagbo’s regime.

At the time, Mr. Ouattara's camp denied any connection with the group but his spokesperson Patrick Achi said they were citizens tired of police attacks who are defending themselves. It is not a stretch to argue that the decision to launch an all-out military offensive to dislodge Mr. Gbagbo was helped by the vulnerabilities in FDS forces (loyal to Gbagbo) exposed by Mr. Coulibaly’s men.

 Dealing with IB now rather than later

Apparently, Mr Soro wants to deal with Mr. Coulibaly once and for all. He doesn’t consider IB as part of the solution. He did not associate him to the national offensive to install Mr. Ouattara. A day after Mr. Gbagbo was captured, there were rumors that Mr. Coulibaly was now allied in Yopougon with the same Gbagbo militias he was battling a couple of days earlier. Last week, Mr Ouattara requested that all belligerents lay down their arms. The message was for IB forces and the rest of Gbagbo militias…not the former Forces Nouvelles of Mr. Soro (now FRCI).

Mr. Soro, the man with the plan

Mr Soro is a political wunderkind. He has qualities in politics that very few possess. He probably wants to be president one day and he has what it takes to reach that goal. His longtime communication aide, Mr. Alain Lobognon, has stated that the Forces Nouvelles exist now as a political movement separate from their armed wing, the de-facto military of Ivory Coast. That’s a powerful position to be in! That’s more power than even Mr. Ouattara can claim right now.

This situation begs one question: Why now?

With Gbagbo militias still running around in Yopougon and other parts of Abidjan terrorizing people and preventing them from returning to work, why engage in a campaign against IB forces right now? What’s the imminent danger caused by the Invisible Commando? Has anyone attempted mediation? reconciliation? compromise?

Ivory Coast is still very fragile and will remain as such for the near future, even if all armed conflicts were to stop today. The FRCI are weak. If it weren’t for the “assist” served-up by French and UN forces, Gbagbo would still be in Cocody and things would be different in Abidjan. The west of the country is far from secure with daily incursions by Liberian militias. Saying that FRCI are able to secure the integrity of the national territory would be a gross exaggeration. As I stated earlier, they haven’t been successful in flushing out the remainder of pro-Gbagbo militias in just one neighborhood of Abidjan, Yopougon. Assuming that attacks against Coulibaly forces were successful, it would create more resentment. His allies would probably regroup and return for more trouble. Ivory Coast does not need more trouble. Ivory Coast needs peace to achieve its potential.

Mogadiscio?

The other warlords, Los, Wattao, Cherif, Morou and Zacaria had a great deal of power in northern regions for a decade. Some of their men were perpetrators of serious crimes pre and post electoral crisis. How will justice be served? Mr. Ouattara promised a thorough review of all cases by national and international jurisdictions. How would a potential prosecution of these warlords affect his agenda…or his longevity? We shall see…sooner rather than later.

There is a risk for even more territorial fragmentation in the post Gbagbo era. Should IB survive the current attack (it seems unlikely), he could settle in Abobo and/or attempt to gain more territory in and outside Abidjan. Other warlords could do the same in areas already under their control. This would be an apocalyptic scenario but it is not impossible given that no one has enough firepower to control the whole country.

What about the RHDP?

Another important element of this equation is the future position of the RHDP (Rassemblement des Houphouétistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix). Mr. Ouattara owes his victory to his alliance with PDCI-RDA and other political parties. According to several reports, the Prime Minister job was to be held by a PDCI-RDA member. The post-electoral crisis led Mr. Ouattara to give the position to Mr. Soro…because he had an army ready just in case. Now what? How long will he keep the job? How would the PDCI-RDA view the enormous power wielded by the former rebels? How long would this alliance hold under these circumstances? We shall see …sooner rather than later.

Paix des braves

Mr. Coulibaly and Mr. Soro should stop fighting with RPGs and fight in the political arena. Mr. Ouattara needs to show his independence and leadership by brokering an impartial agreement. Asking only one side to lay down its weapons in the current situation is tantamount to suicide. Mr. Coulibaly deserves some recognition. Mr. Ouattara was supported nationally and internationally in his quest to be installed as the legitimate leader of Ivory Coast. He must demonstrate that he is his own man and up to the task. It starts with making hard choices, guided by fairness and impartiality.

Update

As I was writing this piece, IB was killed in the FRCI operation against his Invisible Commando in Abobo. Circumstances of his death are still sketchy. One thing is clear, the serial putschist turned liberator was wanted dead, not alive. Mr. Ouattara gave firm orders to capture Mr. Gbagbo alive. Apparently, there were no such orders for IB. Mr. Ouattara is now officially tied to his new forces and therefore accountable for their actions (past, present and future), including alleged human rights violations. He has claimed them, used them and condoned their actions. In the fog of war, we couldn’t see what was happening and who was doing what. The operation against Mr. Coulibaly had the blessing of Mr. Ouattara. It was planned and perfectly executed.

There is still a culture of violence at the heart of the new regime in Abidjan. Talks of national reconciliation cannot be taken seriously when thorny issues are resolved with haste and force. Violence begets violence. Some diehard supporters of Mr. Ouattara are puzzled and in disbelief. His opponents are probably rejoicing as their recruitment efforts just got easier. I am honestly saddened by the turn of events. Mr. Coulibaly was violent, wild, bombastic and self-centered. However his death is not going to bring peace and stability to Ivory Coast. It is a step back on the road to recovery. 

 

Update 2 via UKPA

(UKPA) 

Ivory Coast warlord Ibrahim "IB" Coulibaly was badly beaten before being shot in the chest, his spokesman said.

Felix Anoble confirmed that photographs posted on the internet of a bloody-faced man with an apparent bullet wound to the heart showed 47-year-old Coulibaly after he was killed on Wednesday night.

A commander for defence minister Guillaume Soro had said Coulibaly appeared to have killed himself rather than surrender when troops seized Coulibaly's stronghold in Abidjan. Mr Anoble denied Coulibaly had committed suicide.

"Did you not see the photograph?" he asked. "That's him. His face is all swollen because they beat him badly before delivering the final shot."

Ivory Coast's President Alassane Ouattara, whom Coulibaly had said he considered "a father" on Thursday expressed his regrets at the death of his wife's one-time bodyguard, who began the pro-democracy battle for Abidjan that put him in power.

The blitzkrieg seems to have stalled in Abidjan. 

The FRCI (Forces Républicaines de Cote d’Ivoire) loyal to elected President Ouattara took the country in record time because they encountered little resistance.The FDS (Forces de Défense et de Sécurité) did not fight. They either fled or rallied the FRCI. The FDS were the regular military before Mr. Gbagbo injected politics and regionalism (ethnic preference) in their ranks. So when things got tough, they folded. General Phillipe Mangou, the former army chief of staff, represented that group. So it is no surprise that he bailed out early.

The FRCI, really the former Forces Nouvelles (FN) led by Mr. Guillaume Soro understood the situation. They waited 4 months to study it and then took a gamble.  The strategy as we witnessed in the past 72 hours was very simple. Knowing they would encounter only marginal resistance from the FDS and Gbagbo's militias, they zipped through the country and made their way to Abidjan.

Here is where it gets complicated. The second part of the gamble didn’t work. Gbagbo and his core military support group composed of the Republican Guard, CECOS and militias didn’t fold. They disregarded Mr. Soro’s 2-3 hours ultimatum. They did what some expected they would do: hunker down for an ultimate showdown.  They have superior firepower and truly believe their Christian faith would save them because the cause is just.  Their biggest weakness is that they are cornered. They can resist but there is no prospect for victory in that scenario. It is more like martyrdom.

The FRCI, as we can see on news photos, are not equipped for the heavy fighting necessary to take down the presidential palace and Mr. Gbagbo’s residence. For that they will need the same tanks and heavy artillery their opponents are using to keep them at bay. The FDS camps they seized have no weapons because Mr. Gbagbo never properly equipped them.

In the next 24-48 hours, the FRCI will try to bring in more appropriate weapons from Bouake and other areas now that the supply routes are opened. Unless Mr. Gbagbo finally gets that divine revelation to leave, the bloodbath so feared will take place.

In the meantime, troops from both sides are going to loot and kill innocent victims. It has started, not only in Abidjan but we have verified reports of human rights violations in the west and other towns liberated by the FRCI. The biggest loser, should this continue, is Mr. Ouattara and his primary goal of unifying his nation.

 

07:37pm #civ2010. Le soutien au gouvernement légitime de la Cote

d'Ivoire doit rentrer dans une autre phase. Celle du soutien à la

libération armée.

07:41pm Les forces amies doivent soutenir militairement et

financièrement la résistance du peuple au régime fasciste de Gbagbo.

#civ2010

07:45pm Pour éviter une guerre civile longue et meurtrière, la

CEDEAO doit officiellement ou officieusement épauler les FN.

#civ2010

07:47pm Les fronts Nord et Ouest doivent rapidement épuiser les FDS

et les obliger à se replier vers Abidjan. #civ2010

07:50pm Gbagbo ne peut envoyer trop d'hommes hors d'Abidjan. On

doit l'acculer par des actions du genre PK18. Entraîner des désertions

#civ2010

07:53pm Sans l'argent pour payer les hommes de rangs le moral sera vite

saper et ils retourneront leurs armes contre leurs supérieurs. #civ2010

07:56pm Le temps des manifestations est passé. Les embuscades doivent

continuer. Les FDS ne pourront pas tenir. C'est une certitude. #civ201

 

 First, I must say how honored I am that Professor Seay took the time to respond so rapidly to my post. I have been a fan for a while and the Christian Science Monitor is one of my favorite sources for balanced analysis.

Professor Seay points out three key differences between Rwanda and Ivory Coast. Others who responded directly to my post mentioned a few others. While I agree with the differences, I still hold the position that similarities in this case make my case more than differences disprove it. Let’s look at these differences. Prof Seay wrote:

 

• Exiles aren't invading Ivory Coast and northerners control territory. Both Rwanda and Ivory Coast have significant ethnic cleavages (whether constructed by colonizers or based on religion), but Ivory Coast is different from Rwanda in that the base of power for the northerners (almost all of whom back Ouattara) is in the country rather than outside in a neighboring country. Furthermore, the two sides in this conflict are much more segregated by location than were Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda. Northerners control their territory and have done so for about a decade. I think this makes a real difference in how the fighting will play out. In Rwanda, massacring Tutsis was relatively easy for the Hutu extremists because Tutsis lived next door. In Ivory Coast, while there's certainly a high concentration of northerners in Abidjan and other urban centers, most northerners are in the north. Those who are not can at least try to flee to the north, whereas Tutsis in Rwanda had few options for escape.

For the past 10 years, we had not one, but two countries, separated almost down the middle. During the peace process, the Forces Nouvelles (FN) occupying the northern region were allowed to “enter” the south controlled by the Gbagbo regime. Their leader Mr. Guillaume Soro was prime minister for many years leading to the elections and a large contingent of his forces were in Abidjan and Yamoussoukro. The reverse however did not happen. The northern region never saw a significant influx of Forces de Défense et de Sécurité (FDS) loyal to Mr. Gbagbo. The issue almost derailed the peace process on numerous occasions.

So are “exiles” invading Ivory Coast? If you are a Gbagbo loyalist, the answer is an emphatic yes! Just watch the Radio Television Ivoirienne (RTI) or listen to FPI (Mr. Gbagbo’s party) officials such as Mr. Blé Goudé. Change “rebels” in the text and you have it.

Of course the Forces Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), former FN, don’t see themselves as invaders. Neither did Kagame’s RPF for that matter. They see themselves as liberators, true Ivoirians, emboldened by the “official” blessing given by Mr. Ouattara a few days before operations started.

Even after all the attempts by Mr. Gbagbo to turn this into an ethnic conflict, his success has only been marginal. Framing the Ivory Coast conflict in ethnic terms misses the point. The civil war might have been ethically based, but the post-electoral crisis isn’t. At least, it is not in terms of north vs. south. Mr. Ouattara owes his victory to his alliance with the PDCI-RDA (Houphouet-Boigny’s party) and other smaller parties with their base in the south. The RHDP (le Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix) and its members can’t stand Mr Gbagbo and many of them have been killed.

My fear, as stated in my blog post, isn’t for the whole country. It is for areas currently under firm control of Gbagbo forces, mercenaries and militias. What is going to happen when Mr. Blé Goudé or others give the okay for the “final solution”? Unlike Rwanda, they won’t use machetes but “Kalash” as they call the AK47s distributed publicly and secretly to “young patriots” and other Gbagbo supporters.

Here is the nightmare scenario. The FRCI are gaining ground. Fast. Furthermore, they are occupying FPI strongholds or “Gbagboland”. The theater of the current offensive (Daloa, Gagnoa, etc.) is where his core support group is located (it is also his ancestral home, hotbed of hardliners). Soon, mostly unfounded reports of exactions and killings in areas controlled by the FRCI will reach Abidjan. They will be looped on RTI. It already started on Facebook and Twitter. What’s going to happen in Abidjan when people are told that their families are being slaughtered in their own villages? They are going to use those AK47s on their neighbors. It is going to be systematic and methodical. The blueprint is on Mr. Blé Goudé’s desk. Thinking otherwise would be naïve.

Soon, the FRCI, I am afraid, will conduct their own reprisal killings in areas under their control. This could even spread to areas not affected by the recent offensive where the FRCI might let frustrated northern and central populations hunt for groups suspected of supporting Mr. Gbagbo.

We can seat here and parse words, and talk about mass killings as opposed to genocide and tens of thousands compared to hundreds of thousands. The bottom line is the killing could be massive and be done along lines fitting traditional genocide definitions.

  

• Ivory Coast is richer than Rwanda. The cocoa industry and Ivory Coast's importance as a regional economic power means that a lot more people have an interest in seeing stability and a political solution to the problems there. France has pointedly taken a back seat to ECOWAS and the African Union through much of this crisis to avoid being seen as a neocolonial power pulling the strings (which is exactly what Gbagbo wants France to do). But if things get really nasty, I think we'll see France become increasingly involved.

Yes, ECOWAS would get involved. However it will take months before Nigeria can get its troops on the ground. As for the French, they can indeed intervene to stop this as I stated in my initial post. I hope they do it, before it starts.

 

• Ivoirité is not Hutu Power. Ivoirité is a nasty ideology that developed in Ivory Coast in the mid-1990's as a means of excluding northern Muslims from the country's political space by labeling them as "foreigners." While it's true that Ivory Coast does have a large foreign population (workers come from all over West Africa to provide labor for the cocoa plantations), Ivoirité was not really aimed at them; it was aimed at Ivoirian Muslims and involved an explicit political goal, namely, excluding Ouattara from running for president in 2000. While there are lots of nasty manifestations of the ideology, as far as I know, we have not yet seen the use of Ivoirité to justify mass slaughter of Ivoirian Muslims in the same way that Hutu Power ideology was used to justify the killing of Tutsis. There's a qualitative difference; Hutu Power was always about eliminating Tutsis from the face of the planet, whereas Ivoirité has been about more subtle forms of discrimination and exclusion. That may be changing as we speak, but I imagine it will take some time.

Ivoirité has come and gone. It is irrelevant. The election of Ouattara is the ultimate testimony to that fact. Again, it is simply inaccurate to frame the current crisis in those terms. The post-electoral dynamic is the one that matters. The Ivoirité and other issues that led to the civil war have been eclipsed by the willingness of a majority of Ivoirians to get rid of Gbagbo. Henri Konan Bedié, the father of Ivorité is a Ouattara supporter, a member of the RHDP, and the occupant of a suite at the Golf Hotel. So, I agree that there are no similarities here. The issue is only relevant to the Gbagbo propaganda machine.

Apparently, I am not the only one fearing a doomsday scenario. Just look at the timeline of recent events and decisions by President-Elect Ouattara:

1.    He travels to Nigeria to brief and confer with Mr. Goodluck Jonathan.

2.    He orders by decree the creation of a new military, the FRCI including the FN. I guess it doesn’t look good when the media is reporting that the country is being liberated by rebels. He conferred legitimacy to the FN and their actions, and opened a back door for FDS to rally a republican military.

3.    Mr. Guillaume Soro, head of the FN and Prime Minister of the Ouattara government who was holed-up at the Golf Hotel moves west to the theater of FRCI operations, to take a leadership role.

4.    Word goes out that populations must evacuate Abidjan. Over one million people suddenly leave the capital for their villages. Observers were puzzled because the violence was mainly limited to Abobo and part of Koumassi. Why this orchestrated exodus?

5.    The massive FRCI offensive starts on numerous fronts.

Finally, I would like to make a comment on the FRCI march to Abidjan. It will be fast and relatively easy. However, unless there is a political solution, the battle for Abidjan won’t be easy. Gbagbo has enough firepower to resist for months. That’s the plan, his only plan. Those saying the FRCI will be there in time to avoid the bloodbath are in for a rude awakening. I could be wrong. I want to be wrong.

There are reports of Gbagbo people, including Mr. Blé Goudé, are reaching out to Mr. Ouattara for a way out, a negotiated exit. So far, the answer has been an emphatic no. That’s not a good sign. ECOWAS, France, the US and others must advise Mr. Ouattara to cut a deal. That is going to avoid the loss of innocent lives. Mr. Ouattara currently has the upper hand and he could set reasonable conditions for an orderly transition. He could also overplay his hand by refusing to compromise and lead his nation into uncertainty. So far he has been reasonable. I hope he continues that way.

 

If you have been following the Ivory Coast post-electoral crisis, you must know that Mr. Laurent Gbagbo has had a very bad month of March. No, I am not talking about the senseless killing of unarmed women demonstrating in Abobo or the shelling of the busy market in the same neighborhood. Those killings are only the symptoms of the bad month Mr. Gbagbo was having. I am talking about the fact that militarily speaking, March has been a disaster for him.

First in Abidjan, where over 90% of his best forces are located, Gbagbo lost the battle of Abobo to an “invisible commando” of less than 200 men led by a sandal-wearing commander nicknamed Jack Bauer. This ragtag band of citizen-soldiers armed with antique RPGs, hunting rifles and leather talismans can now be seen parading and patrolling the streets of Abobo, totally in charge.

Second, the west of the country is falling like a deck of cards. After Doke and Blolequin, the road to the strategic port city of San Pedro is wide open. Forces loyal to Mr. Ouattara also control Duekoue and by the time you read this, Guiglo, Daloa, and Bondoukou could also be under the control of the Forces Républicaines de Cote d’Ivoire (FRCI) loyal to President-Elect Alassane Ouattara.

What was evident to a few insiders is becoming clear to the rest of the world: Gbagbo’s army is not fighting back. Members of the Forces de Défense et de Sécurité (FDS) are not ready to die for him. This is not surprising because most of them voted for Mr. Ouattara. Militias in the western region allied with Gbagbo aren’t putting up much resistance either. The mercenaries and other hired guns have been willing to take the money, attack, rape, kill or loot in areas under Gbagbo’s control but shy away from the real fight against the FRCI.  Diehard units such as the Republican Guard (General Ble Dogbo) and the Centre de Commandement des Opérations de Sécurité CECOS (General Guiai Bi Poin) have shown their complete ineptitude in the battle of Abobo.  Finally, there is a climate of suspicion at the top of the military hierarchy leading some to assert that General Mangou is army chief of staff in name only.

So why am I so afraid of the imminent demise of the Gbagbo regime? Well, because it eerily resembles a tragedy we have seen before.  To illustrate this, I am going to use a timeline of the Rwandan genocide available on the PBS site.

Sept.1993-Mar.1994 President Habyarimana stalls on setting up of power-sharing government. Training of militias intensifies. Extremist radio station, Radio Mille Collines, begins broadcasting exhortations to attack the Tutsis. Human rights groups warn the international community of impending calamity.

January-March 2011 Laurent Gbagbo stalls on leaving power and on allowing a national unity government. “Young patriots”, “real Ivoirians” are given weapons and enrolled in the army to defend the nation. Radio Television Ivoirienne (RTI) begins broadcasting exhortations to attack rebels, “non-Ivoirians”, foreigners and UN workers.  Human rights groups warn the international community of impending calamity.

March 1994 Many Rwandan human rights activists evacuate their families from Kigali believing massacres are imminent.

January-March 2011 European Union, United States, United Nations, foreign NGOs and others evacuate families believing massacres are imminent. More troublesome, members of Gbagbo’s inner circle and proponents of a hardline send their family members to Ghana, Benin, France, the US and other countries.

April 6, 1994 President Habyarimana and the president of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira, are killed when Habyarimana's plane is shot down near Kigali Airport. Extremists, suspecting that the president is finally about to implement the Arusha Peace Accords, are believed to be behind the attack. That night the killing begins.

No such thing has happened…yet! But I am afraid hardliners with their back against the wall and aware of their imminent defeat could do anything on their way out.

April 7, 1994 The Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and the interahamwe set up roadblocks and go from house to house killing Tutsis and moderate Hutu politicians. Thousands die on the first day. U.N. forces stand by while the slaughter goes on. They are forbidden to intervene, as this would breach their "monitoring" mandate.

April 8, 1994 The RPF launches a major offensive to end the genocide and rescue 600 of its troops surrounded in Kigali. The troops had been based in the city as part of the Arusha Accords.

April 21, 1994 The U.N. cuts its forces from 2,500 to 250 following the murder of ten Belgian soldiers assigned to guard the moderate Hutu prime minister, Agathe Uwiliyingimana. The prime minister is killed and the Belgians are disarmed, tortured, and shot and hacked to death. They had been told not to resist violently by the U.N. force commander, as this would have breached their mandate.

April 30, 1994 The U.N. Security Council spends eight hours discussing the Rwandan crisis. The resolution condemning the killing omits the word "genocide." Had the term been used, the U.N. would have been legally obliged to act to "prevent and punish" the perpetrators. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of refugees flee into Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire. In one day 250,000 Rwandans, mainly Hutus fleeing the advance of the RPF, cross the border into Tanzania.

May 17, 1994 As the slaughter of the Tutsis continues the U.N. agrees to send 6,800 troops and policemen to Rwanda with powers to defend civilians. A Security Council resolution says "acts of genocide may have been committed." Deployment of the mainly African U.N. forces is delayed because of arguments over who will pay the bill and provide the equipment. The United States argues with the U.N. over the cost of providing heavy armoured vehicles for the peacekeeping forces.

June 22, 1994 With still no sign of U.N. deployment, the Security Council authorizes the deployment of French forces in south-west Rwanda. They create a "safe area" in territory controlled by the government. Killings of Tutsis continue in the safe area, although some are protected by the French. The United States government eventually uses the word "genocide."

July 1994 The RPF captures Kigali. The Hutu government flees to Zaire, followed by a tide of refugees. The French end their mission and are replaced by Ethiopian U.N. troops. The RPF sets up an interim government of national unity in Kigali. A cholera epidemic sweeps the refugee camps in Zaire, killing thousands. Different U.N. agencies clash over reports that RPF troops have carried out a series of reprisal killings in Rwanda. Several hundred civilians are said to have been executed. Meanwhile the killing of Tutsis continues in refugee camps.

August 1994 New Rwandan government agrees to trials before an international tribunal established by the U.N. Security Council.

All of the above, will occur if everything stays the same. While I am happy to see the FRCI’s successes, I would like the world to understand that we have been here before. Gbagbo is boxed in militarily and politically. He has no way out. He is literally a prisoner in Abidjan with nowhere to retreat in Ivory Coast and dwindling options outside of the country. He is an historian and knows what happened to Charles Taylor, Samuel Doe, Dadis Camara and the like. It is only a matter of time till forces loyal to Mr. Ouattara take control of the whole country. What happens between now and then is up to all of us. I don’t know what the trigger will be for UN and French Licorne forces currently in Ivory Coast. The UN and France were in Rwanda. Both were sorry for their reluctance to protect civilians. They will have a do-over. I hope they make the right decisions this time for humanity sake.

La Tunisie n’est pas la Côte d’Ivoire. Les situations sont différentes. Il n’y a pas eu d’élections contestées en Tunisie. La Côte d’Ivoire a le mérite d’avoir organisé de vraies élections où le vainqueur n’était pas connu d’avance. Certes M. Gbagbo, dont le slogan de campagne était « on gagne ou on gagne » ne les aurait surement pas organisées s’il pouvait présager le verdict des urnes. Mais je m’éloigne de mon sujet.

Lorsque M. Alassane Ouattara demande une intervention militaire de la CEDEAO pour l’installer au pouvoir, je ne peux m’empêcher de penser à l’acte de ce vendeur à la sauvette qui fit tomber un régime autoritaire vieux de 23 ans. M. Mohamed Bouazizi, dans son désespoir, s’est immolé par le feu, non pas pour faire tomber ses persécuteurs mais pour affirmer son ultime affranchissement. Son acte a déclenché à Sidi Bouzid et dans le reste de la Tunisie, des manifestations qui ont sonné le glas de la dictature de Ben Ali.

Plutôt que de chercher des sauveurs étrangers, M. Ouattara et ses compatriotes doivent prendre leurs responsabilités. Je me permets de paraphraser Alexis de Tocqueville qui disait que tout peuple a le gouvernement qu’il mérite. La démocratie a un prix. Ceux qui en jouissent de nos jours l’ont payé. Du moins, certains de leurs compatriotes l’ont payé au prix fort pour qu’ils puissent en jouir. Il est peut-être temps que les Ivoiriens saisissent cette opportunité pour affirmer leur refus de l’arbitraire et choisissent de s’affranchir une fois pour toute. Des morts, il y en a tous les  jours. A Abobo, à Ayama, à Duékoué et ailleurs. De pauvres personnes froidement abattues parce qu’elles sont justement sans défense. La peur de la mort est une réaction normale et humaine. L’inaction qui en résulte est un choix. Les Tunisiens ont enduré pendant 23 ans avant d’en finir. Les Ivoiriens prendront le temps qu’il leur faudra mais eux seuls sont maitres de leur destin national.

 

A very quick history refresher is necessary to understand the craziness of the issue at hand.

·         From 1966 to the early 1990s: Ghana was plagued by bloody coups. Its economy was in shambles. Political parties were suspended. Many Ghanaians roamed West Africa shining shoes and yes...turning tricks. The expression "tomber comme Ghana" (down/fallen like Ghana) was often used in the region.

·         From 1992 to 2000: Multipartite democracy was restored. Rawlings was elected and reelected. The economy began a slow but steady rise from the dead. Mr. Rawlings, in spite of his many achievements, respected the constitutional mandate prohibiting more than 2 consecutive terms.

·         John Atta-Mills (from Rawlings’ NDC) ran and lost in 2000 and 2004.

·         In 2009, Mr. Mills won with the slimmest of margins (0.47%). Ghana did not burn. Power was transferred in a peaceful manner.

Mr. Mills is the product of democratic rule. Ghana’s prosperity is unquestionable today. Ghanaians are flocking home and investing in their country. Oil, mining, electricity and other sectors are booming. All made possible thanks to Ghana’s commitment to peaceful democracy and transfer of power.

Mr. Atta-Mills’ ambiguity on the Ivorian crisis is a crushing blow to democratic rule in the region and ultimately in Ghana. He is right and wise to advocate restrain and diplomacy in solving the complicated stalemate in a neighboring country where one million of his countrymen live. However, his statement that Ghana isn’t taking sides is a dagger in the heart of all African democrats. He is de facto siding with Laurent Gbagbo. Mr. Ouattara won fair and square. He had similar scores in the problematic regions during the first round of the elections. The runoff wasn’t perfect. No national election is perfect. Nowhere in this world! But it was perfect enough given the wide margin of the Mr. Ouattara’s victory. Mr. Mills can squeak by with 0.47% and Mr. Ouattara’s 8.2% isn’t enough to represent his fellow Ivorians?

Leaders require courage and vision. Mr. Mills proved today that he has neither. I feel for him.