First, I must say how honored I am that Professor Seay took the time to respond so rapidly to my post. I have been a fan for a while and the Christian Science Monitor is one of my favorite sources for balanced analysis.

Professor Seay points out three key differences between Rwanda and Ivory Coast. Others who responded directly to my post mentioned a few others. While I agree with the differences, I still hold the position that similarities in this case make my case more than differences disprove it. Let’s look at these differences. Prof Seay wrote:

 

  • Exiles aren't invading Ivory Coast and northerners control territory. Both Rwanda and Ivory Coast have significant ethnic cleavages (whether constructed by colonizers or based on religion), but Ivory Coast is different from Rwanda in that the base of power for the northerners (almost all of whom back Ouattara) is in the country rather than outside in a neighboring country. Furthermore, the two sides in this conflict are much more segregated by location than were Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda. Northerners control their territory and have done so for about a decade. I think this makes a real difference in how the fighting will play out. In Rwanda, massacring Tutsis was relatively easy for the Hutu extremists because Tutsis lived next door. In Ivory Coast, while there's certainly a high concentration of northerners in Abidjan and other urban centers, most northerners are in the north. Those who are not can at least try to flee to the north, whereas Tutsis in Rwanda had few options for escape.

For the past 10 years, we had not one, but two countries, separated almost down the middle. During the peace process, the Forces Nouvelles (FN) occupying the northern region were allowed to “enter” the south controlled by the Gbagbo regime. Their leader Mr. Guillaume Soro was prime minister for many years leading to the elections and a large contingent of his forces were in Abidjan and Yamoussoukro. The reverse however did not happen. The northern region never saw a significant influx of Forces de Défense et de Sécurité (FDS) loyal to Mr. Gbagbo. The issue almost derailed the peace process on numerous occasions.

So are “exiles” invading Ivory Coast? If you are a Gbagbo loyalist, the answer is an emphatic yes! Just watch the Radio Television Ivoirienne (RTI) or listen to FPI (Mr. Gbagbo’s party) officials such as Mr. Blé Goudé. Change “rebels” in the text and you have it.

Of course the Forces Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), former FN, don’t see themselves as invaders. Neither did Kagame’s RPF for that matter. They see themselves as liberators, true Ivoirians, emboldened by the “official” blessing given by Mr. Ouattara a few days before operations started.

Even after all the attempts by Mr. Gbagbo to turn this into an ethnic conflict, his success has only been marginal. Framing the Ivory Coast conflict in ethnic terms misses the point. The civil war might have been ethically based, but the post-electoral crisis isn’t. At least, it is not in terms of north vs. south. Mr. Ouattara owes his victory to his alliance with the PDCI-RDA (Houphouet-Boigny’s party) and other smaller parties with their base in the south. The RHDP (le Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix) and its members can’t stand Mr Gbagbo and many of them have been killed.

My fear, as stated in my blog post, isn’t for the whole country. It is for areas currently under firm control of Gbagbo forces, mercenaries and militias. What is going to happen when Mr. Blé Goudé or others give the okay for the “final solution”? Unlike Rwanda, they won’t use machetes but “Kalash” as they call the AK47s distributed publicly and secretly to “young patriots” and other Gbagbo supporters.

Here is the nightmare scenario. The FRCI are gaining ground. Fast. Furthermore, they are occupying FPI strongholds or “Gbagboland”. The theater of the current offensive (Daloa, Gagnoa, etc.) is where his core support group is located (it is also his ancestral home, hotbed of hardliners). Soon, mostly unfounded reports of exactions and killings in areas controlled by the FRCI will reach Abidjan. They will be looped on RTI. It already started on Facebook and Twitter. What’s going to happen in Abidjan when people are told that their families are being slaughtered in their own villages? They are going to use those AK47s on their neighbors. It is going to be systematic and methodical. The blueprint is on Mr. Blé Goudé’s desk. Thinking otherwise would be naïve.

Soon, the FRCI, I am afraid, will conduct their own reprisal killings in areas under their control. This could even spread to areas not affected by the recent offensive where the FRCI might let frustrated northern and central populations hunt for groups suspected of supporting Mr. Gbagbo.

We can seat here and parse words, and talk about mass killings as opposed to genocide and tens of thousands compared to hundreds of thousands. The bottom line is the killing could be massive and be done along lines fitting traditional genocide definitions.

  

  • Ivory Coast is richer than Rwanda. The cocoa industry and Ivory Coast's importance as a regional economic power means that a lot more people have an interest in seeing stability and a political solution to the problems there. France has pointedly taken a back seat to ECOWAS and the African Union through much of this crisis to avoid being seen as a neocolonial power pulling the strings (which is exactly what Gbagbo wants France to do). But if things get really nasty, I think we'll see France become increasingly involved.

Yes, ECOWAS would get involved. However it will take months before Nigeria can get its troops on the ground. As for the French, they can indeed intervene to stop this as I stated in my initial post. I hope they do it, before it starts.

 

  • Ivoirité is not Hutu Power. Ivoirité is a nasty ideology that developed in Ivory Coast in the mid-1990's as a means of excluding northern Muslims from the country's political space by labeling them as "foreigners." While it's true that Ivory Coast does have a large foreign population (workers come from all over West Africa to provide labor for the cocoa plantations), Ivoirité was not really aimed at them; it was aimed at Ivoirian Muslims and involved an explicit political goal, namely, excluding Ouattara from running for president in 2000. While there are lots of nasty manifestations of the ideology, as far as I know, we have not yet seen the use of Ivoirité to justify mass slaughter of Ivoirian Muslims in the same way that Hutu Power ideology was used to justify the killing of Tutsis. There's a qualitative difference; Hutu Power was always about eliminating Tutsis from the face of the planet, whereas Ivoirité has been about more subtle forms of discrimination and exclusion. That may be changing as we speak, but I imagine it will take some time.

Ivoirité has come and gone. It is irrelevant. The election of Ouattara is the ultimate testimony to that fact. Again, it is simply inaccurate to frame the current crisis in those terms. The post-electoral dynamic is the one that matters. The Ivoirité and other issues that led to the civil war have been eclipsed by the willingness of a majority of Ivoirians to get rid of Gbagbo. Henri Konan Bedié, the father of Ivorité is a Ouattara supporter, a member of the RHDP, and the occupant of a suite at the Golf Hotel. So, I agree that there are no similarities here. The issue is only relevant to the Gbagbo propaganda machine.

Apparently, I am not the only one fearing a doomsday scenario. Just look at the timeline of recent events and decisions by President-Elect Ouattara:

1.    He travels to Nigeria to brief and confer with Mr. Goodluck Jonathan.

2.    He orders by decree the creation of a new military, the FRCI including the FN. I guess it doesn’t look good when the media is reporting that the country is being liberated by rebels. He conferred legitimacy to the FN and their actions, and opened a back door for FDS to rally a republican military.

3.    Mr. Guillaume Soro, head of the FN and Prime Minister of the Ouattara government who was holed-up at the Golf Hotel moves west to the theater of FRCI operations, to take a leadership role.

4.    Word goes out that populations must evacuate Abidjan. Over one million people suddenly leave the capital for their villages. Observers were puzzled because the violence was mainly limited to Abobo and part of Koumassi. Why this orchestrated exodus?

5.    The massive FRCI offensive starts on numerous fronts.

Finally, I would like to make a comment on the FRCI march to Abidjan. It will be fast and relatively easy. However, unless there is a political solution, the battle for Abidjan won’t be easy. Gbagbo has enough firepower to resist for months. That’s the plan, his only plan. Those saying the FRCI will be there in time to avoid the bloodbath are in for a rude awakening. I could be wrong. I want to be wrong.

There are reports of Gbagbo people, including Mr. Blé Goudé, are reaching out to Mr. Ouattara for a way out, a negotiated exit. So far, the answer has been an emphatic no. That’s not a good sign. ECOWAS, France, the US and others must advise Mr. Ouattara to cut a deal. That is going to avoid the loss of innocent lives. Mr. Ouattara currently has the upper hand and he could set reasonable conditions for an orderly transition. He could also overplay his hand by refusing to compromise and lead his nation into uncertainty. So far he has been reasonable. I hope he continues that way.